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INTRODUCTION 
My objective in this Article is to offer a description of property as 
an institution for organizing the use of resources in society.  There are 
several strategies for deciding how valued things will be used, and by 
whom.  “Might makes right” is one approach:  we can let a strongman 
decide these questions.  Bureaucratic governance is another:  we can 
create a hierarchical organization and adopt rules and procedures for 
allocating resources.  Group consensus is a third:  questions about re-
source use can be resolved through meetings and discussion among 
those most closely involved.1  The claim advanced here is that property 
is a distinctive strategy for determining how resources will be used and 
by whom.  It is worth trying to figure out what differentiates it from 
other strategies for performing this function. 
All organized human societies use the property strategy to one 
degree or another.  Preliterate societies, with the possible exception of 
the most primitive hunter-gatherers, follow the property strategy with 
respect to certain resources, like tools, baskets, and crops.  The most 
resolute communist states, such as Stalinist Russia or North Korea, give 
individuals unique rights to control certain resources, such as clothing 
and toothbrushes.  Even within small and informally organized social 
groups like households, a version of the property strategy typically 
prevails with respect to certain objects such as toys, books, articles of 
clothing, and even bedrooms.  My effort here is to unearth the com-
mon denominator that characterizes formal and informal uses of 
property in a wide range of social settings as a means of organizing the 
use of resources. 
 
1 These descriptions of alternatives are skeletal and are not meant to be exhaustive.  
With respect to bureaucratic governance, for example, what I principally have in mind 
are government bureaucracies, such as the Bureau of Land Management, state highway 
commissions, and municipal public housing authorities.  Obviously, there are many other 
types of hierarchical organizations that manage resources, including business corpora-
tions and nonprofit organizations like universities.  See generally HENRY HANSMANN, THE 
OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996).  I do not explore the many distinctions among dif-
ferent hierarchical organizations here, nor do I deny that from the perspective of an 
organization, its assets are typically held as a form of private property.  Group consensus 
also covers a variety of subtypes, ranging from preliterate hunting clans to Israeli kib-
butzim to cooperative apartment houses. 
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Once we have uncovered the common denominator of the prop-
erty strategy in its different manifestations over time and place, certain 
implications follow for the law of property.  Property law is highly com-
plex, and all of its details cannot be reduced to the elemental features 
of the property strategy.  Nevertheless, the law of property builds upon 
and grows out of the property strategy.  The features of the property 
strategy can be seen as the base of a pyramid, the upper reaches of 
which are occupied by highly refined and often arcane doctrines, such 
as the law of future interests, common-interest communities, patent 
and copyright law, and asset securitization.  Rather than seeking to 
understand the institution of property by generalizing from one or 
more of these refined legal doctrines, I submit that a better approach 
is to consider what makes property work in its most elemental applica-
tions.  We can then better understand the reasons for, and limits on, 
the property strategy that we find in the law of property. 
I.  THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE PROPERTY STRATEGY 
The general form of the property relationship has long been recog-
nized.  Broadly speaking, the property strategy is one of decentralized 
control over resources.  Specific resources are assigned to designated 
persons who have unique prerogatives in dealing with the resource 
relative to all other persons in the relevant normative community.  As 
Huntington Cairns once wrote, “The property relation is triadic:  ‘A 
owns B against C,’ where C represents all other individuals.”2  None-
theless, we can still ask what it means to “own” something.  What does 
it mean to hold something “against” all other individuals?  We can be 
more specific about each of the three components of this triadic rela-
tion:  owner, object, and the concept of ownership. 
Let us begin with the objects organized under the property strategy.  
The property strategy applies to “things”—discrete resources.3  To call 
something a “resource” is to indicate that it has value to people.  It is 
something desired by human beings and it is scarce in that there is not 
enough to satisfy everyone’s desire for it.  When things—such as mos-
quitoes—are not desired by human beings, they will not be governed 
by the property strategy.  Or if something is valuable but so plenteous 
 
2 HUNTINGTON CAIRNS, LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 59 (1935). 
3 See Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1700-16 
(2012) (discussing “the modularity of things and by extension the legal relations de-
fined in terms of them”). 
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that there is no perceived scarcity—like oxygen in the air—it will not 
be governed by the property strategy. 
The resource must also be discrete.  There are many values that 
are not discrete or “thing-like” enough to qualify as objects of the 
property strategy.  Some resources are too abstract to be regarded as 
discrete, such as ideas or cultural knowledge.4  Other values are too 
closely connected to persons to be regarded as discrete resources, such 
as an individual’s reputation5 or (perhaps) his or her body parts and 
fluids.6  The Takings Clause applies only to interferences with specific 
assets and not to reductions in net worth due to the imposition of 
general liabilities.7  An interesting question debated by contemporary 
English philosophers is whether something that has exchange value 
and nothing else, such as a bank account balance, should be regarded 
as “property.”8 
Different societies recognize different resources as being eligible 
for treatment as property.  Many primitive societies recognize property 
in tools, weapons, and foodstuffs, but not in land.  Communist nations 
recognize property in personal possessions, but not in factories or 
apartment buildings.  Western capitalist societies once recognized 
property in other persons, but slavery is now universally outlawed on 
moral grounds.  There is significant variation among different countries 
today in the degree to which they enforce intellectual property rights.  
A variety of contingent social circumstances influence what is eligible 
for treatment as property, including the relative scarcity of the resource, 
limits imposed by the costs of delineating a resource so as to make it 
 
4 Both ideas and cultural knowledge are excluded from intellectual property regimes.  
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (“In no case does copyright protection . . . extend to 
any idea, . . . concept, principle, or discovery . . . .”); Russel L. Barsh, Grounded Visions:  
Native American Conceptions of Landscapes and Ceremony, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 127, 141 
(2000) (“[C]opyright only applies to new works by individual authors, not to old collec-
tive traditions, or ‘folklore.’”). 
5 See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972) (discussing reputation as a 
liberty interest, not a property interest). 
6 See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 489 (Cal. 1990) (holding 
that spleen cells were not the property of the patient from whom they were extracted). 
7 Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 900-
07, 974-78 (2000). 
8 See J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 50-51 (1996) (discussing how “cashable 
rights” “are treated as property”); J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 129-32 
(1997) (discussing choses in action, a category of property encompassing company 
shares, bank balances, debts, and other negotiable instruments). 
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discrete, and different political, cultural, and moral beliefs.9  The fact 
that the set of things eligible for treatment as property is socially con-
tingent does not mean, however, that the basic triadic-relation charac-
teristic of the property strategy is similarly contingent. 
What, then, can we say about the subjects of the property strategy—
those we call “owners”?  The key to being an owner is having the ca-
pacity to manage discrete resources.  In simple settings, owners are 
individuals—ordinary human beings.  This is true in complex societies 
as well:  all of us own property.  The property strategy can also be im-
plemented by conferring ownership on juridical persons, including 
family enterprises, partnerships, cooperatives, corporations, trusts, and 
nonprofit organizations.  As long as an entity is organized in such a 
way as to allow it to manage discrete resources, it is eligible for the 
status of owner. 
Because the property strategy requires that discrete resources have 
identifiable owners, open-access resources, whether described as “in-
herently public property” or the “common heritage of mankind,” re-
main outside the domain of the property strategy. 10   Similarly, 
resources that are “fugacious” in their natural state, like wild animals, 
have traditionally been regarded as unowned until they are captured.11  
 
9 See Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction:  The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property 
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331, S331 (2002) (“[P]roperty regimes are not static but 
change over time.”); see also Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights:  
A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 164-68 (1975) (presenting “a theory of 
property rights evolution” expressed in terms of marginal benefits and costs). 
10 See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons:  Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 723-30 (1986) (offering examples of and considering 
various rationales for open-access resources). 
11 See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431, 434 (1920) (“[Missouri] alleges a 
pecuniary interest, as owner of the wild birds within its borders . . . . Wild birds are not 
in the possession of anyone; and possession is the beginning of ownership . . . . 
[T]omorrow [they] may be in another State and in a week a thousand miles away.”); 
Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (“The . . . authorities are decisive to 
shew, that mere pursuit, gave Post no legal right to the fox, but that he became the 
property of Pierson, who intercepted and killed him.”).  A number of commentators 
have suggested that an open-access resource like a fishery can be regarded as a form of 
community property.  See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. 
ECON. REV. 347, 354 (1967) (“Communal ownership means that the community denies 
to the state or to individual citizens the right to interfere with any person’s exercise of 
communally-owned rights.”).  Community property presents an interesting borderline 
case because, insofar as the community excludes outsiders and is governed by a well-
defined and enforced set of norms, it is not inappropriate to describe the community 
as a manager and, therefore, to regard the arrangement as falling within the prop- 
erty strategy.  As exclusion of outsiders weakens and norms become contested, such  
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Here too, the resource has no manager in its natural state.  Hence, it is 
not included in the property strategy.  Other resources are declared to 
be open to all as a matter of policy, such as navigable waterways12 or 
patents and copyrights that have expired and returned to the public 
domain.13  If management by a designated owner has been ruled out 
on policy grounds, the property strategy does not apply. 
Just as with the set of “things” eligible for ownership, we also find 
considerable variability over time and space in terms of the identities 
of those who are eligible to serve as owners.  In many primitive societies, 
men, but not women, can own property.14  In England and the United 
States, until the latter part of the nineteenth century, married women 
were severely restricted in their capacity to own property.15  Some legal 
systems recognize ownership by partnerships as entities and others do 
not; some recognize trusts as owners and others do not, and so forth.  
As is the case with the set of things eligible for ownership, these cul-
tural and legal variations on who can serve as an owner do not detract 
from our general understanding of the nature of the triadic property 
relation, where the property strategy applies. 
The crux of the property strategy lies in the concept of owner-
ship—that is, in the nature of the prerogatives given to those called 
owners.  Often these prerogatives are described in terms of the right to 
exclude others and correspond to a general duty imposed on others to 
desist from interfering with the object without its owner’s permission.  
As I have previously written, the owner’s right to exclude is a necessary 
 
communities tend to look more like open-access regimes.  The further a community-
regulated resource falls toward the open-access end of the spectrum, the less plausible 
it is to regard it as being managed in any meaningful sense, and hence to regard it as 
following the property strategy.  See generally Thráinn Eggertsson, Open Access Versus 
Common Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS:  COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 73, 86 (Terry 
L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003). 
12 See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust 
Doctrine:  What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 801-03 (2004). 
13 See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 882 (2012). 
14 See, e.g., A.S. DIAMOND, PRIMITIVE LAW PAST AND PRESENT 82-83, 87 & n.3, 112 
(1971) (noting that in ancient Babylonian law “the father of the family . . . [became] 
the legal owner of all its property,” in ancient Chinese law “the wife owned no . . . 
property,” and in ancient Indian law the wife also had no property (citations omitted)). 
15 See generally Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s Property Law:  1800–1850, 71 GEO. 
L.J. 1359, 1384-412 (1983) (tracing the development of married women’s property acts 
in both England and the United States); Ben Griffin, Class, Gender, and Liberalism in 
Parliament, 1868–1882:  The Case of the Married Women’s Property Acts, 46 HIST. J. 59, 62-83 
(2003) (chronicling the reform in British law brought about by the Married Women’s 
Property Acts). 
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condition of identifying something as being property.16  Authors widely 
agree, at least with qualifications.17  Even some contemporary property 
“pluralists” agree that exclusion is an ever-present element in identify-
ing something as property.18 
Describing the prerogatives of ownership in terms of the right to 
exclude has the virtues of simplicity and vividness.  It conjures up the 
image of the owner as a kind of mini-sovereign exercising absolute au-
thority over her thing by repelling intruders and banishing unwanted 
freeloaders.19  But framing the critical set of attributes in terms of exclu-
sion obscures the intuitive understanding of what ownership entails.  
When scholars claim that property is defined by the right to exclude, a 
chorus erupts:  What about inclusion?  What about the right of use?  
What about the power to “set the agenda” for the thing?20  Must the 
owner’s rights be exclusive?  What about co-ownership?  What about 
obligations to the community?  Rather than joust over whether exclu-
sion entails other attributes, or whether it is or is not compatible with 
various qualifications, it is more profitable to specify the central charac-
teristics of ownership with greater precision. 
I contend that two prerogatives characterize ownership in all of its 
manifestations.  The first is the recognition by other persons in the 
relevant normative community that the owner exercises residual mana-
gerial authority over the owned object.  The second is the recognition 
by other persons in the relevant normative community that the owner 
enjoys residual accessionary rights with respect to the owned object.21  In 
 
16 Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 731 (1998). 
17 See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 8, at 13 (stating that property in the primary sense 
consists of things which are “the subject of direct trespassory protection”); PENNER, 
supra note 8, at 71 (“[T]he right to property is a right to exclude others from things 
which is grounded in the interest we have in the use of things.” (emphasis omitted)); 
JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 39 (1988) (“The owner of a re-
source is simply the individual whose determination as to the use of the resource is 
taken as final . . . .”). 
18 See HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY:  VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 37 (2011) (conceding 
that “every property right involves some power to exclude others from doing something”). 
19 See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (“[P]roperty [is] that sole and 
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the 
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”); cf. 
Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927) (developing the 
analogy between ownership and sovereignty). 
20 See, e.g., Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 
275, 278 (2008). 
21 Something similar to my two prerogatives has been recognized by what is some-
times called the “property rights” theory of the business firm.  According to this account, 
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other words, what is often loosely described as the “right to exclude” 
can be characterized with greater precision as twin rights of residual 
managerial authority and residual accessionary rights.  Give someone 
the right to exclude the world from some thing, and, almost without 
exception, that person will have residual managerial authority and re-
sidual accessionary rights over the thing.  The right to exclude is critical 
not for its own sake, but because it yields these two further attributes.22   
What do I mean by managerial authority?  The concept is pretty 
straightforward.  Start with an owner and a discrete resource.  The 
owner is the manager of the resource.  The owner has broad discre-
tionary authority to decide who gets to enter or touch it, what it will be 
used for, what it looks like, and whether or to what extent it will be 
combined with other things in some larger enterprise.  To exercise 
managerial authority is to be in charge of the resource and to have the 
last word about what will be done with it. 
Notice, however, that I have described this aspect of ownership 
prerogative in terms of residual managerial authority, not simply man-
agerial authority.  Why the qualifier?  It means that the discretionary 
authority of the manager is qualified by obligations that limit what the 
manager can do with the thing.  The owner is in charge and has the 
last word, but this authority is residual because its exercise will nearly 
always be constrained in various ways.23  Some of these constraints will 
be the product of explicit or implicit contractual agreements previously 
made by the owner.  Some will come about because of prior convey-
ances of limited rights to others, such as easements and servitudes.  
 
the owners of a business firm (the shareholders) have two key entitlements:  the power 
to make residual control decisions and the right to receive residual financial flows.  See 
PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 288-
93 (1992) (introducing the concepts of residual control and residual returns); Oliver 
Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 
1120-21 (1990) (same); see also Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and 
Benefits of Ownership:  A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 716 
(1986) (“Ownership is the purchase of . . . residual rights of control.”).  Bob Ellickson 
has extended this analysis from the business firm to the household.  See ROBERT C. 
ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD:  INFORMAL ORDER AROUND THE HEARTH 60-64 (2008).  
My account extends this analysis further, with modifications, to property rights more 
generally. 
22 For a more detailed economic model developing the thesis that the right to ex-
clude confers residual control over an asset, see Hart & Moore, supra note 21, at 1125-31. 
23 Armen Alchian may have been the first to perceive this feature of the property 
strategy.  He described property rights as “a method of assigning to particular individuals 
the ‘authority’ to select, for specific goods, any use from a nonprohibited class of uses.”  
ARMEN A. ALCHIAN, ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK 130 (1977) (emphasis added).  
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Some are defined by common law duties, such as the law of nuisance.  
Some come about because of police power regulations or community 
norms.24 
Nevertheless, these qualifying obligations, however numerous, do 
not exhaust what can be done with the resource.  Property is not just a 
long list of do’s and don’t’s.25  If it were, then we would no longer be 
operating under the property strategy.  The property strategy requires 
that the obligations imposed on the owner be sufficiently limited in 
number and scope that we can comfortably say the owner has a wide—
indeed, open-ended—set of options about what to do with the discrete 
resource. 
Because the discretionary authority of the designated manager is 
residual, the strength of property rights varies significantly from one 
context to another, from one place to another, and from one legal 
system or society to another.  The owner of an acre of land in rural 
Arkansas has more discretionary authority over the use of the land 
than does an owner of an acre of land in Manhattan.  The discretionary 
authority of an owner of an iPad in the United States as to what appli-
cations, music, and video clips to load or erase on the device is greater 
than the discretionary authority of a similar owner in China.26  But all 
of these owners still have significant residual management authority—
enough so that we can comfortably say that they partake in the property 
strategy. 
Less familiar may be the idea that the owner has residual acces-
sionary rights over the resource.27  What does this mean?  It means that 
 
24 What I am characterizing as “subtractions” from owner managerial authority can 
also be regarded as alternative methods of delineating property rights.  See Henry E. 
Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance:  Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL 
STUD. S453, S454-55 (2002) (arguing that property “rights fall on a spectrum between 
the poles of exclusion and governance,” and that in addition to the issue of who can 
exclude whom, we must attend to “a wide range of rules, from contractual provisions, 
to norms of proper use, to nuisance law and public environmental regulation” that 
limit the property right in question). 
25 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and 
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 375-84 (2001) (criticizing the list-of-uses conception of 
property adopted in post-Coasean law and economics as “lead[ing] to an incomplete 
picture of property”). 
26 See, e.g., Sharon LaFraniere et al., China Reins In Entertainment and Blogging, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2011, at A1 (discussing examples of Internet and media censorship in 
China); Edward Wong, Beijing Imposes New Rules on Social Networking Sites, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 17, 2011, at A9 (same). 
27 For a discussion of the wide range and ubiquity of accessionary rights, see Thomas 
W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459, 462-74 (2009). 
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as the value of the resource changes, the owner automatically captures 
this change in value—gain or loss.  The property strategy requires that 
the owner—the person or entity who exercises residual managerial 
authority—also be the one who captures changes in the value of the 
thing over time.  The concept of accessionary rights also means that 
ownership of a thing entails ownership of emergent resources that 
have a prominent connection to the thing.  Ownership of land includes 
plants that grow on the land, ownership of animals includes offspring 
born to those animals, and so forth.28  If new resources prominently 
connected to the original resource were up for grabs by the first taker, 
or were distributed in equal parts to everyone, or were systematically 
taxed away by the state, then we would have departed from the property 
strategy. 
To illustrate, suppose I buy a funky painting at an art fair.  If, years 
later, it turns out that the artist is regarded as a genius, I capture the 
gain in value of the painting.  But if the painting is hardly worth the 
canvas on which it is painted, I suffer the loss.  Or, suppose I own a 
mare, and the mare gives birth to a colt.  Now, I own both the mare 
and the colt.  The concept is familiar and intuitive, even if the phrase I 
am using to describe it—accessionary rights—may not be. 
Of course, the accessionary gains and losses are also net of specific 
obligations, such as contractual obligations.  Thus, accessionary rights 
are residual, just as management authority is residual.  Indeed, some 
economists have defined property as residual claimancy, meaning that 
the owner is the one who gets the residual value after all other claims 
are satisfied.29  Although this characterization is too narrow, since it 
leaves the critical element of residual managerial authority out of the 
picture, it highlights an equally important attribute of the property 
strategy—often overlooked—which I have called accessionary rights. 
To recap, the property strategy is an institution for organizing the 
use of resources in society that has the following features:  designated 
persons called owners are given residual management authority and 
residual accessionary rights over discrete resources.  The set of persons 
eligible to serve as owners and the set of things regarded as discrete 
resources eligible for ownership vary from one society and one social 
setting to another.  The size of the “residual” claim in both residual 
 
28 See, e.g., id. at 464-65; infra note 31 and accompanying text. 
29 See, e.g., YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 3-9 (2d ed. 
1997). 
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management authority and residual accessionary rights also varies 
from one society and social setting to another.  But the basic architec-
ture of the strategy—owner, object, residual authority, and accessionary 
rights—is the same in all contexts and defines the property strategy 
relative to other strategies for organizing the use of resources. 
II.  SOME ILLUSTRATIONS 
In order to make the previous discussion more concrete, it is help-
ful to consider some illustrations of the property strategy in disparate 
settings.  This exercise will also help clarify the very broad range of 
applications that the property strategy permits. 
A.  The American Family Farm 
There are any number of straightforward examples of the property 
strategy that will be familiar to persons living in modern capitalist 
economies.  As a kind of archetypical example, consider a typical 
American family farm devoted to growing cash crops like corn and 
soybeans.  The operation includes a number of discrete resources, 
most centrally arable land, but also buildings, machinery, and water 
wells.  The owner, typically an individual or a married couple, is identi-
fied on the deed to the land, although the precise identity of the owner 
need not be widely known in the community as long as it is clear that 
the land is owned. 
The owner clearly enjoys residual managerial authority over the 
use of the land and associated resources like buildings, machinery, and 
water wells.  To be sure, the owner’s discretion in managing these re-
sources is constrained in a number of ways, including obligations to 
the government assumed as part of crop subsidy or soil bank programs, 
contractual obligations to seed companies, environmental regulations 
that control the use of pesticides and herbicides on the land, labor 
laws that regulate contracts with hired hands, the common law of nui-
sance, and social norms that prevail in the relevant community.30  But, 
 
30 See TRIMBLE R. HEDGES, FARM MANAGEMENT DECISIONS 17-20, 91-94, 327-29, 528 
(1963) (recognizing that farmers are subject to government regulation of pesticide use, 
the common law of property and contract, controls that accompany government subsi-
dies, employment rules promulgated by regulatory agencies, and social customs); PENN 
STATE UNIV., COLL. OF AGRIC., THE FARM MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 7 (George L. 
Greaser ed., 1991) (discussing farmers’ contractual duties to parties who supply neces-
sary inputs); G.F. WARREN, FARM MANAGEMENT 525 (1914) (“One’s success is very largely 
controlled by the community.”). 
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subject to these constraints, the owner enjoys broad residual discretion 
in determining what to plant, how much to plant, when to plant, when 
to apply fertilizers and weed and pest controls, when to harvest, what 
machinery to use in these operations, whether and whom to hire to 
assist in these operations, whether to store the harvest, when to sell, to 
whom to sell, and so forth. 
Similarly, the owner also enjoys residual accessionary rights with 
respect to the land.  In particular, the owner can claim the value of the 
crops that sprout and grow out of the land. 31  Again, these accessionary 
rights are net of specific obligations.  The owner may have to satisfy 
debts to banks for the purchase of the land and to various suppliers of 
machinery and seed; she may have to pay wages to hired hands who 
assisted in planting and tilling the crops.32  But, once these obligations 
are met, the owner will capture the residual gain (or loss) associated 
with the effort to make the resource yield a crop. 
Thus we see in the example of the family farm all the elements of 
the property strategy:  an owner, a discrete resource (actually, a num-
ber of discrete resources), and residual management authority and 
accessionary rights. 
B.  Native American Tribes 
There is a common misconception that aboriginal societies either 
had no concept of property or regarded all resources as being held in 
common by the tribe or clan.33  At least for more advanced hunter-
gatherer and agricultural societies, this notion is almost certainly incor-
rect.34  We know it is incorrect if only because of the well-documented 
 
31 See Merrill, supra note 27, at 465. 
32 See HEDGES, supra note 30, at 100-05, 505-08 (describing capital requirements 
and costs of farming, including costs of real estate, labor, machinery, and other inputs); 
WARREN, supra note 30, at 297 (recognizing obligations resulting from farmers’ use of 
mortgages to finance their capital outlays); id. at 339-44 (describing obligations in-
curred to hired laborers); id. at 355-63 (discussing obligations inherent in owning, using, 
or renting machinery). 
33 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 305 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690) (“[T]he wild Indian . . . knows no Inclosure, and is 
still a Tenant in common . . . .”); HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 124-32 (Peter 
Smith ed., 1970) (1861) (conjecturing that private property evolved out of common or 
communal property). 
34 Extremely primitive hunter-gatherer clans may have had little sense of individual 
possession, in part because they put a premium on being able to travel light.  See MAR-
SHALL SAHLINS, STONE AGE ECONOMICS 9-14 (1972).  Others have surveyed the an-
thropological understanding of property among more advanced preliterate societies.  
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and widespread practice of gift-giving in such societies.35  One cannot 
offer an object as a gift to another unless they share the understanding 
that the object “belongs” to the giver and that the giver is transferring 
this control to the recipient.  Thus, any society that engages in gift ex-
change recognizes at least some form of the property strategy. 
Accounts of the practices of Native American tribes in precolonial 
times confirm that they followed the property strategy, at least as to 
some resources.  William Cronon has offered a detailed account of the 
understanding of property among Native Americans in New England 
before the appearance of European settlers.36  With respect to personal 
goods such as baskets, hoes, kettles, bows and arrows, and canoes, 
“ownership rights were clear:  people owned what they made with their 
own hands.”37  Sharing of personal property was common and “there 
was little sense either of accumulation or of exclusive use.”38  Neverthe-
less, “every proprietor [knew] his own.”39 
With respect to land, Cronon tells us that Native American tribes 
had territorial claims to use particular tracts of land for certain pur-
poses, such as hunting, fishing, or berry gathering.40  These claims 
were in the nature of usufruct rights—rights to discrete things that last 
only as long as they are used—and often overlapped with claims of 
other tribes to use the same land for other purposes.  Native Americans 
understood plots of land used for growing corn, however, as belonging 
exclusively to specific families.  Individual family members—nearly 
always women—would till, plant, and harvest the land for periods of 
 
See, e.g., Martin J. Bailey, Approximate Optimality of Aboriginal Property Rights, 35 J.L. & 
ECON. 183 (1992); see also MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY 350-70 
(1952) (describing land tenure in various agricultural societies); E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, 
THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 46-63 (1954) (applying “fundamental legal concepts” to 
the study of the “law” of primitive societies). 
35 See MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT:  FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC 
SOCIETIES 17-45 (Ian Cunnison trans., 1954) (analyzing the history and function of 
gifts in primitive societies); SAHLINS, supra note 34, at 185-230 (describing the many 
facets of “exchange” in primitive societies); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society, 
with Special Reference to Law, 23 J.L. & ECON. 1, 16-19, 24-25 (1980) (same). 
36 WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND:  INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOL-
OGY OF NEW ENGLAND (1983). 
37 Id. at 61. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation omitted). 
40 See id. at 63 (noting that English theories, under which agricultural use was a 
necessary condition of property ownership, could not accommodate Native Americans’ 
territorial claims to “clam banks, fishing ponds, berry-picking areas, [and] hunting 
lands”). 
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eight to ten years, until they abandoned it when soil nutrients gave 
out.41  The family would then lay claim to some other plot of land for 
purposes of growing corn, and would exercise exclusive control over 
that plot.  Similarly, exclusive rights were recognized in territories where 
the tribes set traps for animals in the winter.42  In effect, whenever 
productive use of the land required a combination of investment, 
monitoring, and harvesting, something like the property strategy was 
recognized among the Native Americans as the mode of organizing 
the use of resources.43 
This pattern generally seems to hold for other aboriginal societies 
that have advanced beyond nomadic hunting.  As Marshall Sahlins 
states with respect to usufruct rights to land in preliterate societies that 
engage in agriculture, “The producers determine on a day-to-day basis 
how the land shall be used.  And to them falls the priority of appropria-
tion and disposition of the product . . . .”44  This is a succinct statement 
of the twin principles defining ownership under the property strategy:  
residual management authority and residual accessionary rights. 
C.  The Household 
A much more unusual place to look for the property strategy is the 
household—the most common unit of social organization in which 
people sleep and share meals.  Bob Ellickson has written an instructive 
book exploring the social structure of the household that is attentive 
to the manner in which resources are organized in these social units.45  
Within the household, a complex division of responsibilities typically 
prevails based on norms of reciprocity and gift exchange.  Yet control 
over certain key household resources is invariably assigned to those 
who provide the capital needed to acquire them.  Specifically, those 
who supply the capital to construct or purchase the physical structure 
in which the household resides are routinely afforded discretion in 
 
41 Id. at 48. 
42 Id. at 64. 
43 This, of course, is the central claim of Harold Demsetz in his famous article dis-
cussing the emergence of exclusive beaver-hunting territories after European traders 
created market demand for beaver pelts.  Demsetz, supra note 11, at 352. 
44 SAHLINS, supra note 34, at 93; see also Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 
YALE L.J. 1315, 1399 (1993) (reporting a “‘universally applicable’ cultural rule that a 
crop is the private property of the individual, household, or narrow kinship line that 
has cultivated it” (citation omitted)). 
45 ELLICKSON, supra note 21. 
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determining whether to make major modifications or repairs to the 
structure.46  This arrangement holds whether the structure is owned 
(typically subject to a mortgage) or rented.  When the occupant owns 
the structure, the owner or the co-owners make decisions affecting the 
structure; when she rents it, the landlord makes these decisions.47 
More intriguingly, the internal organization of the household often 
entails the assignment of specific spaces—such as bedrooms, corners 
of rooms, or even particular chairs in rooms—to particular individuals.  
These assignments are often only implicit, yet they can give rise to “an 
informal entitlement.”48  Imagine a suburban house with four bedrooms:  
one is assigned to mom and dad, a second to a twenty-something-year-
old daughter who has returned home from college looking for work, a 
third to a teenage son, and a fourth to grandpa.  It is not too far-
fetched to see this kind of assignment of entitlements as an instance of 
the property strategy at work.  Different members of the household 
have been given residual managerial authority and accessionary rights 
over different bedrooms.  There may be household rules, such as “no 
smoking,” that constrain the residual managerial authority of each 
owner.  But so long as these rules are satisfied, the bedroom assignees 
have residual discretion about how to decorate the room, whom to 
invite in for a chat, what music to play, and so forth.  Each assignee 
also captures changes in value attributed to decorating choices and 
good or bad housekeeping.  The application of the property strategy 
may be weak here, because the owners of the house (mom and dad) 
have the authority to switch to the “might makes right” strategy and 
reduce the sphere of residual authority on particular dimensions.  But 
the same is potentially true under other applications of the property 
strategy.  The tribal strongman or the state may also decide to prohibit 
certain uses of resources.  Such a choice will reduce the scope of owner 
discretion, but will not mean that the object is no longer owned. 
The point is that the property strategy is not limited to rights that 
enjoy the imprimatur of law or even of the customs of the relevant social 
unit, like the tribe or clan.  It also operates inside households, business 
firms, schools and universities (think of faculty offices), and even on 
 
46 Id. at 64-75. 
47 See id. at 86-91 (“[E]ven during the rental period, the provisions of the lease are 
likely to limit a tenant’s control over . . . the physical condition of the premises . . . .”). 
48 Id. at 118. 
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basketball courts.49  As long as there is a discrete resource and some-
one who exercises residual management authority and residual acces-
sionary rights with respect to the resource, the property strategy is at 
work. 
III.  NONNECESSARY FACILITATING FACTORS 
The forgoing account of the property strategy omits certain features 
that figure prominently in other accounts of property.  I have said 
nothing about the state.  Nor have I mentioned the right to alienate 
(transfer) owned objects.  My position is that neither the state nor the 
right of alienation is a necessary feature of the property strategy.  They 
are highly useful; indeed, they can multiply the value of property many 
times over.  But the property strategy can operate in societies that lack 
a formal system of government (like preliterate societies) or in infor-
mal settings (like households).  And it can operate whether or not the 
resource is alienable. 
A.  The Role of the State 
It is common to say that property is an institution created by the 
state.  Indeed, a number of thinkers, including Jeremy Bentham most 
prominently, have said that there can be no property without the 
state.50  Nevertheless, the examples offered in the previous Part—and 
scholarship about social norms more generally—suggest that this notion 
is not correct.51  It is possible to have a system in which designated per-
sons have residual managerial authority and accessionary rights over 
discrete resources but in which the state and formal law play no role at 
all.  The property strategy can also be sustained by social or even intra-
familial norms.52 
 
49 See Ellickson, supra note 44, at 1387 (describing conventions for allocating basket-
ball court space when there are more players than space available). 
50 See 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 146-47 (Étienne Dumont ed., 
Charles Milner Atkinson trans., 1914) (1802) (“Property and law were born together, 
and would die together.  Before the laws property did not exist; take away the laws, and 
property will be no more.”). 
51 See, e.g., JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 71-83 (1988) (doc-
umenting informal allocations of rights among lobster fishermen); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, 
ORDER WITHOUT LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 40-64 (1991) (documenting 
informal norms that control cattle-trespass disputes). 
52 Alchian observed that property rights can be “supported by the force of etiquette, 
social custom, ostracism, and formal legally enacted laws.”  ALCHIAN, supra note 23, at 129. 
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The example of a household in which different members are as-
signed their own bedrooms illustrates this point.  The assignment of 
rooms is not reflected in any formal deed or contract that could be 
enforced in a court of law.  The property strategy here is created en-
tirely by norms that evolve within one close-knit social group.  The as-
signment of tools, weapons, canoes, and cornfields among Native 
Americans also demonstrates this point.  Precolonial native tribes had 
no written laws and no formal institutions for resolving disputes or 
meting out punishments to miscreants.53  The property strategy was 
sustained by longstanding social norms and reinforced by self-help, 
ostracism, and other social sanctions.  For this reason, I have omitted 
any mention of the state from the basic description of the property 
strategy. 
That said, it is undoubtedly true that the property strategy will be 
more effective if there is a state—provided the state wants to advance 
the property strategy.  The state plays two roles under the property 
strategy.  On the one hand, it can support the strategy by backstopping 
the owner.  On the other, it can undermine the strategy by taking the 
owner’s property without compensation or otherwise threatening the 
security of property rights. 
The state can backstop the authority of the owner in a number of 
ways.  For example, it can enact laws that forbid the destruction or 
theft of others’ property, and it can institute a criminal justice system 
to charge and convict persons who break these laws.  Further, the state 
can give owners civil remedies, such as the common law actions for 
trespass, nuisance, conversion, and replevin, which can be used to pre-
serve owner control over discrete resources.  Perhaps most importantly, 
the state can give owners the privilege to use self-help to deter and 
punish interferences with their property rights without fear of legal 
liability.  Self-help is, in practice, the most important source of protec-
tion for owners, whether in the form of fences, locks, alarms, guards, 
or watchdogs.54  If alienation of property is permitted, the state can 
help to define exchangeable forms of property, establish registries of 
 
53 See CRONON, supra note 36, at 59 (explaining that authority within New England 
tribes was based more on kin relations than on “more formal state institutions”); DIA-
MOND, supra note 14, at 202-03, 217-23 (recognizing the absence of written law among 
precolonial native tribes and noting that “there is no police, no one has jurisdiction 
and there is hardly any action by the community or any part of it to punish breaches”). 
54 Consider the number of car thefts prevented by door locks, keyed ignition sys-
tems, burglar alarms, and LoJack systems relative to the number of criminal prosecu-
tions or civil damages actions against car thieves. 
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rights, and enforce contracts exchanging rights.  The basic point is 
that although state support is not a necessary condition of the property 
strategy, the stronger the state support given to owners, the more 
effective the property strategy will be. 
Second, the state has a role in staying its own hand from interfer-
ing with the prerogatives of owners.  We can call this role government 
forbearance.55  This function can mean, for example, that the govern-
ment makes a credible promise not to expropriate resources that have 
been allocated to a designated person, or at least to pay compensation 
to owners when it does expropriate.56  But forbearance takes many 
other forms as well, including committing to make changes in the reg-
ulation of property prospectively rather than retroactively, giving owners 
hearing rights before seizing their resources for alleged violations of 
legal obligations, and establishing and maintaining a legal culture in 
which courts generally seek to protect the expectations of owners.57 
State backstopping and forbearance, like other variables we have 
surveyed, will differ from one time and place to another.  If the gov-
ernment provides only a corrupt judicial system and operates like a 
bandit state—seeking to expropriate productive effort by citizens to 
enrich those who control the state apparatus58—then the property 
strategy will be severely tested.  It is unlikely that property will disap-
pear altogether, because the property strategy is likely to persist in 
small group settings where it can be supported by social norms.  But in 
extreme circumstances—such as those that prevailed in Stalinist Russia 
or Maoist China—a state committed to expropriation can significantly 
suppress the use of the property strategy.59 
 
55 See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
ch. XI (2007) (discussing the varieties of government forbearance to promote security 
of property). 
56 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use 
without just compensation.”). 
57 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 55, ch. XI. 
58 For the idea of a bandit state, see MANCUR OLSON, POWER AND PROSPERITY:  
OUTGROWING COMMUNIST AND CAPITALIST DICTATORSHIPS 10-11 (2000). 
59 See MAURICE J. MEISNER, MAO’S CHINA AND AFTER 420 (3d ed. 1999) (“[I]t was 
precisely the absence of private ownership of the means of production that came to 
crucially define Chinese society only a few years after the Communist victory of 1949.”); 
RICHARD PIPES, RUSSIA UNDER THE BOLSHEVIK REGIME 386-403 (1993) (“[L]ocal offi-
cials . . . felt at liberty to appropriate food, cattle, even clothing for their personal 
use. . . . The system operated on the absurd principle that the more the peasant pro-
duced the more would be taken from him . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
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B.  The Right of Alienation 
We tend to associate property with alienability—the right to buy 
and sell discrete things and designate who takes them after their owners 
die.  One old saw of Anglo-American property law is that absolute re-
straints on alienation are “repugnant to the [fee]” and are thus void as 
a matter of public policy.60  But here, too, I do not believe that aliena-
tion is essential to the property strategy.  When the property strategy is 
supported by social norms—as with the bedrooms in our example of 
the household—there is typically no right of alienation.  Similarly, 
there have been many societies (e.g., the Native Americans) that have 
recognized only usufruct rights.  As we have seen, these rights can be 
regarded as incorporating a version of the property strategy. 
As in the case of state support, a robust right of alienation makes 
for a more effective property strategy.  The power to alienate helps to 
solve a simple but serious problem:  how do you replace the manager 
of a discrete resource when she is no longer doing an effective job?  If 
resources are managed by a “might makes right system,” then a strong-
man can take away a weak or ineffectual manager’s resource and give 
it to someone else whom he thinks will be a better manager.  If re-
sources are managed by a bureaucracy, then higher-ups can fire an 
ineffectual manager, or at least reassign him to a different position.  
But the property strategy makes every manager a kind of sole propri-
etor—the manager is her own boss.  How does one convince a sole 
proprietor that the time has come to resign? 
Here the solution has generally been to rely on the right of aliena-
tion—to allow the manager to transfer the property to someone else.  
For the most part, this method of changing managers works reasonably 
well.  If A believes that B is a poor manager, A can offer to buy the 
resource from B at a price that reflects A’s confidence about being 
able to extract more value from the resource than B.  Often as not, B 
will implicitly agree with this assessment; at least, B will compare what 
B has been able to make of the resource with what A is offering, and 
will agree to the transfer if the deal with A is more advantageous.  Over 
time, the system of voluntary alienation allows management authority 
over resources to be shifted around until they end up being managed 
 
60 Potter v. Couch, 141 U.S. 296, 315 (1891); accord JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RE-
STRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY § 105 (Boston, Boston Book Co., 2d ed. 1895). 
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by those who can extract the most value from them—those who can 
operate them most efficiently.61 
Of course, selecting managers through alienation does not work 
perfectly.  Some poor resource managers are delusional; others are 
very stubborn.  Consequently, the system of assignment by alienation 
has been supplemented by other methods of changing managers that 
come into play in extreme circumstances.  The doctrine of adverse 
possession is one such method.  If the manager totally falls down on 
the job and disregards the resource for a significant period of time, 
someone else can take over and operate the resource in an open and 
notorious fashion for a specified period of time (usually multiple 
years), after which she will be declared the new manager by operation 
of law.  Adverse possession can thus be seen as a method of firing 
owners in cases of extreme neglect of duties.  Eminent domain is an-
other such fallback method.  If a manager stubbornly refuses to trans-
fer his property to another person who is willing to pay a premium 
over the existing value based on a different contemplated use, or if a 
manager allows his property to become blighted, the government can 
condemn the property and force a transfer in return for just compen-
sation.62 
The central point, however, is that the power of alienation, although 
useful in reassigning managerial rights to resources, is not a necessary 
condition of the property strategy.  One can imagine a property strategy 
that makes managerial reassignments only when use ceases (the usu-
fruct), upon death, by adverse possession, or eminent domain.  I would 
readily concede that these systems would be handicapped relative to 
one that uses voluntary alienation to reassign managerial authority.  
But these systems would still partake of the property strategy in its 
general form. 
 
61 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *9 (“[I]t was found, that what became incon-
venient or useless to one man was highly convenient and useful to another . . . . Thus 
mutual convenience introduced commercial traffic, and the reciprocal transfer of 
property by sale, grant, or conveyance . . . .”). 
62 These sorts of compulsory exchanges of property typically go by the name “eco-
nomic development” and are controversial.  See generally Janice Nadler et al., Government 
Takings of Private Property (describing public attitudes toward economic development 
takings), in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 286 (Nathaniel Persily 
et al. eds., 2008). 
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IV.  ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF  
THE PROPERTY STRATEGY 
The property strategy has a number of powerful advantages, but it 
also presents some serious drawbacks.  Our collective assessment of 
where to strike the balance between these strengths and weaknesses 
determines the extent to which we use the property strategy in organ-
izing resources.  Every society will strike the balance differently, and 
every society will likely strike the balance differently for different 
classes of resources. 
A.  Advantages of the Property Strategy 
1.  Local Knowledge 
The first advantage of the property strategy derives from its reliance 
on decentralized management.  The property strategy draws heavily on 
local knowledge about resources:  where they are, what they are, what 
they are good for, and what sorts of practices or techniques will extract 
the most value from them.  The aggregate of all local knowledge about 
resources greatly exceeds the knowledge that can be accumulated and 
meaningfully acted upon by any centralized institution, such as a 
strongman or a bureaucracy.  This observation is a variant on Friedrich 
Hayek’s famous argument for why market economies are more efficient, 
due to information costs, than centrally planned economies.63  Modern 
economies require those engaged in industrial production to process 
vast amounts of information—about what to produce, who will pro-
duce it, in what amounts, of what quality, and so forth.  The information 
is so vast and complex that no single organization can process and act 
upon it with any degree of accuracy.64  Hence, centrally planned econ-
omies, such as that of North Korea, inevitably suffer from enormous 
inefficiencies, whereas market economies, such as that of South Korea, 
typically perform better because they rely on individualized decision-
 
63 See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Information in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526 (1945) 
(arguing that when knowledge of relevant facts is dispersed among many people, the 
pricing system will effectively coordinate economic activity); see also LUDWIG VON MISES, 
HUMAN ACTION:  A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 694-711 (Ludwig von Mises Inst. 1998) 
(1949) (arguing that human planning and cooperation are best optimized by a system 
that relies on the efforts of individual actors without centralized management). 
64 See MISES, supra note 63, at 694-711 (noting the informational failures of top-
down resource management). 
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making by autonomous production facilities responding to signals sent 
by the pricing system.65 
The same point can be made about the property strategy with re-
gard to the management of discrete resources.  Any human society, 
from the most primitive to the most technologically advanced, faces a 
complex problem of how to regulate the management of discrete re-
sources.  Especially as the resources—such as individual tools and 
clothing—are utilized on a regular basis by particular persons, local 
knowledge about the resource will loom extremely large relative to the 
knowledge available to those with a more remote connection to the 
resource.66  Thus, it is not surprising that every known human society 
has followed the property strategy with respect to things like tools and 
clothing.67  Even North Korea recognizes private property rights in bi-
cycles and shoes.68 
Similar considerations suggest that the ability to harness local 
knowledge under the property strategy will produce more efficient 
management of all types of discrete resources.  Returning to the Amer-
ican farm, we might find that one portion of the land may be too hilly 
and rocky for crops, yet still suitable for grazing livestock.  The owner 
of the farm is likely to understand this information, if only intuitively.  
If a government agriculture department made production decisions, 
by contrast, it is much less certain that such fine-grained distinctions 
would register.  The department might decree that the entire farm 
must be used for growing crops, or that none of it could be put to this 
use—either way, an inevitable loss of production would result.  Over 
time, as relative prices shift and the technology for terracing hilly land 
changes, the calculus for optimal land use may change.  But the prop-
erty strategy will always be informed by a detailed knowledge of the 
 
65 See The World Factbook:  Country Comparison ::  GDP – Per Capita (PPP), CENT.  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
rankorder/2004rank.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (estimating that as of 2011, the 
GDP per capita of South Korea was $31,700, whereas the GDP per capita of North Korea 
was $1800). 
66 See supra note 63. 
67 See Edgar Bodenheimer, The Case Against Natural Law Reassessed, 17 STAN. L. REV. 
39, 41-42 (1964) (chronicling the history of various natural and common law doctrines 
and noting that “private property in some articles of personal consumption, such as 
tools and clothing, is almost universally recognized”). 
68 BARBARA DEMICK, NOTHING TO ENVY:  ORDINARY LIVES IN NORTH KOREA 14, 52 
(2009). 
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different conditions that prevail on different portions of the farm and 
will thus have an edge in agricultural management.69 
2.  Incentives to Maximize Value 
A second major advantage of the property strategy is that it creates 
a powerful incentive for owners to work hard to obtain the highest 
value from resources.  This incentive arises from the feature of the 
property strategy that assigns residual accessionary rights to the owner.  
The routine capture of all changes in value means that the owner auto-
matically internalizes the benefits and costs associated with the exer-
cise of his delegated managerial function.  Decisions that expand or 
reduce output inure to the benefit or detriment of the owner.  This 
means that the owner has a powerful incentive to manage the resource 
so as to maximize its value.  The conventional way of describing this 
feature of the property strategy is that it allows the owner to “reap 
where [she] . . . has sown.”70  Property encourages diligence, because 
the one making the effort will garner the fruits of her labor.71 
Notice that the property strategy does not confer rewards on those 
who labor by asking in each case whether the one who has labored 
“deserves” to reap the reward.  The property strategy proceeds, instead, 
by automatically allocating to the owner all gains and losses associated 
with the asset, whether they are deserved or not.72  This automatic 
accession principle nevertheless establishes the incentive structure that 
elicits the labor and effort from the owner, because she knows that 
whatever additional value she is able to create will be hers rather than 
someone else’s. 
 
69 Experience seems to confirm the superiority of the property strategy in the con-
text of agriculture.  See Ellickson, supra note 44, at 1331 (concluding from a variety of 
evidence that “family farming is ubiquitous” and that “collectivized agriculture almost 
always fails”). 
70 Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918). 
71 This insight is old and familiar and can be found, for example, in the works of 
Blackstone and Bentham.  See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *4, *7 (“It was clear 
that the earth would not produce her fruits in sufficient quantities, without the assistance 
of tillage:  but who would be at the pains of tilling it, if another might watch an oppor-
tunity to seise upon it and enjoy the product of his industry, art, and labour?”); BENTHAM, 
supra note 50, at 196-208. 
72 Merrill, supra note 27, at 459 (“[A]ccession can be seen as the critical legal prin-
ciple that generates the internalization function of property, insofar as gains and losses 
attributable to the management of resources are automatically assigned to the most 
prominently connected property by accession.”). 
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Another way to think about this feature of the property strategy is 
that it functions like a giant profit-sharing plan—and a very generous 
one at that.  Under the property strategy, the designated manager gets 
100% of the profits associated with the manager’s operation of the 
“profit center.”  It is common wisdom among those who study man-
agement that profit-sharing plans usually increase effort by managers.73  
So too with the property strategy.  In contrast, organizations that man-
age resources with a strongman or bureaucratic strategy are notorious 
for shirking by the governed. 
3.  Scalability 
A third and less-noted advantage of the property strategy is that it 
renders the management of resources “scalable,” meaning that the size 
and complexity of managerial units can be adjusted up or down with-
out redesigning the basic architecture of control.74  The owner can add 
or subtract increments of resources and continue to exercise residual 
managerial authority and enjoy residual accessionary rights just as be-
fore, only on a different scale of operation.  This arrangement is pos-
sible because each unit of property added or subtracted is subject to 
the same general principles of residual control and accessionary rights.  
Insofar as all relevant units are governed by the property strategy, each 
owner can adjust the scale of her operations up or down until she 
reaches her “comfort zone.”  If some units are governed by different 
strategies, like bureaucratic control, then scalability becomes more 
difficult. 
The point can be illustrated by reference to the American family 
farm.  Suppose the farm starts out as 160 acres, but, due to advances in 
farming technology, the efficient scale of operation requires a mini-
mum of 320 acres.  The owner can augment the original 160 acres by 
acquiring additional acreage in order to reach the more efficient scale.  
As she adds additional acres, they are automatically subject to the re-
sidual managerial authority and residual accessionary rights of the 
owner, just like the original 160 acres.  The farmer can scale up the 
operation without changing the system of control or the incentive 
structure.  Conversely, suppose the original farming operation consists 
 
73 See, e.g., Douglas L. Kruse, Profit Sharing and Productivity:  Microeconomic Evidence 
from the United States, 102 ECON. J. 24, 29-36 (1992) (concluding that profit-sharing plans 
generally increase managerial effort). 
74 Smith, supra note 3, at 22. 
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of a mixture of cultivation of crops and raising livestock, but the owner 
decides that this type of operation involves excessive complexity and it 
would be more efficient to concentrate exclusively on growing crops.  
The owner can divest herself of livestock, and buildings and equip-
ment designed for raising livestock in order to scale down the com-
plexity of the operation to one solely devoted to crops.  Again, the scal-
scaling down can occur without any change in the system of control or 
incentives. 
4.  Avoiding Tragedies of the Commons 
A fourth advantage of the property strategy is that it can overcome 
certain pathologies associated with open-access resources—the so-
called “tragedy of the commons.”75  If everyone is free to pursue re-
sources—whether wild game, fish, roots, berries, or a corn crop—
people may wastefully race to be first to capture the resource.  An open-
access commons may also lead to excessive or premature consump-
tion of the resource and inadequate incentives to stock or cultivate 
the resource.76  Eliminating the open-access character of a resource 
and substituting property rights is a promising way of eliminating these 
problems.  Designating an owner for a portion of the resource, giving 
the owner residual management authority (i.e., the right to exclude 
others), and allowing the owner to capture the accessionary gains from 
his or her management activity will likely bring wasteful racing behavior 
to an end.  Shifting to a property strategy will also help time consump-
tion to achieve maximum sustainable yields and will create incentives to 
prudently restock and cultivate the resource. 
Of course, the property strategy cannot solve all tragedies of the 
commons.  Some resources, such as ocean fisheries, are too difficult to 
delineate in a cost-effective fashion.77  And, as Elinor Ostrom has 
shown, there are a variety of regulatory measures, including many 
grounded in custom, that can mitigate tragedies of the commons in 
 
75 See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) 
(addressing the inherent problems in common-rights resource management in an in-
creasingly overpopulated world). 
76 See Merrill, supra note 27, at 482-88 (discussing the pathologies associated with 
first possession rights) and accompanying text. 
77 See id. at 483, 484 & n.17 (noting the severity of the tragedy of the commons in 
ocean fishing). 
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lieu of the property strategy.78  Still, and quite significantly, the property 
strategy is a tried and true device for overcoming tragedies of the 
commons. 
5.  Foundation for Exchange 
Yet another advantage of the property strategy is that it creates the 
foundation for the exchange of rights.  I have argued that alienability 
is not a necessary condition of having a property strategy.79  But the 
converse is not true:  it is not possible to have a system in which re-
sources can be exchanged for value without first adopting the property 
strategy.  Indeed, it is impossible to have a system that recognizes gift-
giving, which we find in a great many preliterate societies, without first 
adopting the property strategy.80  In order to make contracts for the 
exchange of resources, or to transfer resources from one person to 
another by gift, one must know who controls what resources.  The 
property strategy answers these questions.  By identifying the singular 
manager of each resource, the property strategy creates the condition 
that makes it possible for the exchange of resources to unfold. 
The property strategy is a necessary condition for exchange to de-
velop because it dramatically reduces transaction costs.  It does so in two 
distinct ways, one internal and the other external.  First, the property 
strategy lowers transaction costs internally by concentrating decision-
making authority in a singular designated owner.  As a general rule, 
the more people who must agree for any change to take place, the 
more difficult it is to reach agreement.81  As anyone who has chaired a 
consensus-seeking committee knows, reaching unanimous agreement 
takes a lot of time and a lot of compromising.  The property strategy 
avoids these costs by giving the owner unilateral decision making au-
thority over the disposition of the asset.  It does not grant total control, 
of course—residual unilateral discretion is the more accurate charac-
terization.  Still, the property strategy lowers transaction costs because 
the owner can act without having to forge a consensus among multiple 
 
78 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:  THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 8-23 (1990). 
79 See supra Section III.B. 
80 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
81 See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:  
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 97-98, 111-12 (1965) (noting 
the higher costs of making a decision associated with supermajority or unanimity rules). 
Merrill Revised Final.doc (DO NOT DELETE)  6/7/2012 7:57 AM 
2012] The Property Strategy 2087 
 
stakeholders.82  This cost differential is why resource management 
strategies that rely on bureaucratic control or group consensus are not 
likely to generate significant levels of exchange—at least, not officially 
sanctioned exchange. 
Second, the property strategy reduces transaction costs externally, 
by increasing the number of potential transacting partners.  This cost 
savings is a function of the decentralization of managerial authority 
inherent in the property strategy.  If ownership is spread widely 
throughout the society, each owner has a very large set of potential 
partners with whom to engage in exchange.  If one owner produces 
corn and wants to swap with another owner who grows wheat, then the 
first owner can potentially engage in exchange with multiple owners 
who produce wheat.  This arrangement allows the owner to avoid the 
holdup problems associated with small-numbers bargaining.  And, 
subject to constraints imposed by transportation and search costs, it 
allows the owner to strike the most advantageous exchange of rights. 
When we combine these internal and external transaction cost–
lowering features of the property strategy, we are well on our way to 
the general argument for the superior allocative efficiency of markets 
envisioned by Adam Smith and his intellectual descendants.83 
6.  Checks and Balances 
The property strategy also has advantages that are social and polit-
ical rather than economic.  One advantage is that it can help check 
and balance political power in a society.  Because of its decentralized 
nature, the property strategy tends to disperse resources to large num-
bers of people in society rather than concentrating them in the hands 
of one strongman, state bureaucracy, or other collective decision-
making body.  This dispersion of resources also tends to diffuse power—
although not perfectly, of course.  Owning land or productive ma-
chinery does not translate directly into owning guns—or even exerting 
influence over those who have guns.  Nevertheless, property ownership 
can be a source of countervailing power to that of the strongman, gov-
ernment, or others more generally. 
 
82 See Henry Hansmann, Condominium and Cooperative Housing:  Transactional Efficiency, 
Tax Subsidies, and Tenure Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 25, 34-37 (1991) (discussing the high 
costs of collective decisionmaking in common interest communities). 
83 See, e.g., 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 162-67 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1976) (1776). 
Merrill Revised Final.doc (DO NOT DELETE) 6/7/2012 7:57 AM 
2088 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 2061 
 
Checks and balances are vital to preserving liberty, and dispersed 
property ownership provides an important source of checks and bal-
ances.84  For example, private ownership of resources allows political 
dissidents to organize opposition parties and distribute literature critical 
of the government.85  It allows unpopular minorities to resist threats 
from the government.86  By giving individuals control over resources, 
the property strategy also allows individuals to exercise more control 
over the direction of their lives outside the political sphere.  The prop-
erty strategy therefore supports the ideal of individual liberty. 
7.  Personhood 
The final advantage of the property strategy is that it facilitates the 
full realization of personal goals and aspirations.  As Margaret Radin 
has written, property is an integral aspect of personhood.87  Although 
individuals should not be defined by their possessions, each person 
selects, shapes, and relies upon her possessions in determining who 
she is and what she seeks to achieve in life. 
We should not get too carried away about the importance of partic-
ular objects, like books, rings, and family homes, to human flourishing.  
Human beings are adaptable creatures, and many unfortunate souls 
have lost all their property in wars and natural disasters and yet gone 
on to live fulfilling lives.  Still, it is undoubtedly true that some degree 
of continuity in the objects we rely upon in our daily lives is critical to 
our development of plans and realization of goals for the future.  As 
Erving Goffman has written, the first step in stripping persons who 
enter totalizing institutions like prisons and asylums of their identity is 
to take away all their personal property.88  Thus, whether the individual 
is a hunter gathering his bow to pursue game, a cook returning to the 
kitchen to prepare a meal, or an author scanning her notes to write a 
 
84 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 15 (1962) (“The preservation 
of freedom requires the elimination of [the] concentration of power to the fullest pos-
sible extent and the dispersal and distribution of whatever power cannot be eliminated—
a system of checks and balances.”). 
85 See Ellickson, supra note 44, at 1352-55 (“The private ownership of any valuable 
resource . . . can confer the economic independence that permits genuine political and 
social choice.”). 
86 See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 772 (1964) (“Like the Bill 
of Rights, property represents a general, long range protection of individual and pri-
vate interests . . . .”). 
87 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). 
88 ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 18-21, 28, 48-49 (1961). 
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book, the ability to count on unquestioned managerial authority over 
particular objects is vital to the realization of a host of individual objec-
tives.  The critical role of property in shaping individual lives must 
therefore also be counted as an important advantage of the property 
strategy. 
B.  Disadvantages of the Property Strategy 
Although the property strategy has been applauded for these posi-
tive functions, it also has negative attributes, which should not be 
ignored in any global assessment. 
1.  New Externalities 
The property strategy entails dividing the world up into separate 
parcels of land or discrete objects of personal property, each with its 
individual owner.  One advantage of this strategy, as we have seen, is 
that it eliminates certain kinds of externalities, notably those associated 
with commons tragedies.  But the very process of carving up the world 
of resources into little boxes of ownership generates the preconditions 
for new externalities.  By dividing the world into units of autonomous 
owner control, the property strategy creates a built-in incentive for 
owners to ignore aspects of their management that affect other units 
of autonomous owner control. 
Externalities come in two varieties, negative and positive, and divid-
ing the world of resources into discrete units of ownership can exacer-
bate both.  Negative externalities are spillover effects from one human 
activity that have adverse consequences for other human activities.89  
Familiar examples are pollution and accidents.  If A uses his land in a 
way that generates pollution, thereby harming his neighbor B, he has 
generated a negative externality.  Or, if C allows his car to deteriorate 
into an unsafe condition, in which it poses a danger on the road to D 
and other drivers, he has created a negative externality.  The very strat-
egy of allowing owners to appropriate the gains from their property—
the accessionary rights feature—creates an incentive to minimize the 
costs associated with managing the property. This incentive is especially 
great if the costs can be foisted on to someone else (i.e., the owners of 
some other property). 
 
89 See Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1642-44, 1649-51 
(2011) (defining and analyzing negative externalities). 
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Positive externalities, on the other hand, are spillover effects from 
one human activity that have a positive effect on other human activi-
ties.90  They too can become a matter of concern under the property 
strategy.  Here the worry is that the property strategy will generate too 
few positive externalities.  For example, suppose I grow clover on my 
land and my neighbor keeps bees.  If I plant one kind of clover rather 
than another, honey production next door will increase by fifty per-
cent.  But because my neighbor captures the benefit of increased honey 
production, I have little incentive to choose the more bee-friendly vari-
ety of clover.  In this instance, the property strategy fails to provide a 
sufficient incentive for me to manage my land in a way that will benefit 
my neighbor.91 
In short, by dividing resources into mine and thine, the property 
strategy solves some externality problems but also creates others.  In 
order to address the new externalities created by the property strategy, 
it may be necessary to switch—at least in part—to some other system 
for organizing the use of resources, such as government oversight or 
community consensus.92 
2.  Monopoly 
Another concern about the property strategy is monopoly.  Property, 
by its very nature, confers monopoly-like control on the designated 
owner with respect to the discrete resource.  In this sense, every prop-
erty right is a monopoly right.  Ordinarily, this feature is of no concern.  
For example, each farmer has a monopoly on his own land.  But if 
there are thousands of farmers producing a substantially identical 
commodity, like wheat, there will be vigorous competition among the 
farmers in the wheat market, and the monopoly each farmer has over 
his own production facilities will have no effect on the price that con-
sumers must pay for wheat. 
In other circumstances, however, granting property rights can 
create monopolies with troublesome social consequences.  For example, 
if I own the only piece of land on which it is feasible to build a bridge 
 
90 See id. at 1649-50, 1716-17 (defining and analyzing positive externalities). 
91 Of course, social norms or Coasean bargains may sometimes internalize these 
and other externalities.  See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees:  An Economic Inves-
tigation, 16 J.L. & ECON. 11, 12-13 (1973) (explaining that beekeepers often contract 
with neighboring apple farmers). 
92 Ellickson, supra note 44, at 1334-35 (discussing “large events” and the difficulty 
of regulating them under a private property regime). 
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across a river, I may have a monopoly on river-crossings, and, with it, 
the power to extract large tolls from the public for the privilege of using 
the bridge.  Similarly, the award of patents or copyrights may allow the 
owners of these rights to extract large payments from the public if 
there are no good substitutes for what they have created.93  This con-
cern, therefore, suggests that the property strategy will become prob-
lematic insofar as the monopoly rights conferred by property coincide 
with a distinct market for particular goods or services.  In these cir-
cumstances, it may be necessary to modify property rights by applying 
antitrust law or some other form of regulation.94 
3.  Public Access Networks 
No man is an island, and neither is his property.  A world in which 
every resource was controlled by the property strategy would make 
travel, commerce, and human interaction very difficult.  If rivers, or 
different segments of rivers, were privately owned, water transportation 
would be subject to the exclusion rights of river owners.  As Ellickson 
puts it, “To make a trip, a traveller would have to bargain for a license 
of passage upon arrival at each private boundary.  This long sequence 
of two-party transactions would entail grotesque transaction costs, im-
pairing mobility.”95  The same is true of highways, streets, and, with the 
advent of air travel, navigable airspace.96  Analogous points could be 
made about communications facilities like telephone lines and fiber 
optic cables for digital communications, as well as public utility lines 
transporting electricity, water, and natural gas.  Paradoxically, private 
property must be interlaced with networks of open-access or public 
property if it is to work effectively as a strategy for managing resources. 
Before the rise of the modern bureaucratic state, the need to pre-
serve transportation and communication networks was recognized 
through a bevy of public rights doctrines that limited the scope or the 
 
93 See 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, IP AND ANTITRUST:  AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW §§ 1.3, 4.2 (2002). 
94 For the potential of antitrust law to deal with such anticompetitive conduct, see 
id. § 1.3b. 
95 Ellickson, supra note 44, at 1382. 
96 See STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY?:  THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL AIR-
SPACE FROM THE WRIGHT BROTHERS ON 291-93 (2008) (discussing the transaction cost 
problem associated with navigable airspace). 
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exclusivity of property rights.97  The public trust doctrine, for example, 
precluded the transfer of control over navigable waterways into private 
hands.  Doctrines of public dedication, public prescription, and cus-
tomary rights assured that pathways used to move goods and people 
from one place to another could not be closed off.  With the rise of 
the bureaucratic state, the dominant solution has become public own-
ership of public access networks.  The government is said to own the 
navigable waterways, the streets and highways, and the navigable air-
space.98  It owns and licenses the “ether” in which broadcasting signals 
are sent.99  It also regulates the terms of access and pricing of public 
utilities, such as those provided by electric, gas, landline telephone, 
and cable TV companies.100 
The property that the government owns or otherwise supplies for 
public access networks is either purchased or acquired by eminent 
domain.  The government then manages its property either directly 
through government bureaucracies or indirectly through private bu-
reaucracies operating under government supervision.101  The result is a 
Swiss-cheese pattern of ownership alternating between private and 
public property.  Private property is much more valuable as a result, 
but this added value requires a significant compromise in the use of 
the property strategy. 
4.  Risk 
By concentrating management authority and accessionary gains 
and losses in a singular owner, the property strategy magnifies incentives 
for innovation and hard work.  But it also enhances the risk individual 
owners face if, for some reason, disaster befalls their particular re-
source.  A crop can be wiped out by an insect infestation, or a patent 
can be rendered irrelevant by a competitor’s better invention. 
 
97 See Thomas W. Merrill, Private Property and Public Rights (surveying legal doctrines 
relating to public domain, public streets, highways, airspace, and public use takings), in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 75, 77-80 (Kenneth Ayotte 
& Henry E. Smith eds., 2011). 
98 See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946) (“The air is a public 
highway, as Congress has declared . . . . Common sense revolts at the idea [of] private 
claims to the airspace . . . .”). 
99 See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2006) (declaring “the control of the United States over all 
channels of radio transmission”). 
100 See Merrill, supra note 97, at 85 (discussing public rights in the context of utilities). 
101 See id. at 78-81. 
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It is reasonable to assume that most people want to hedge against 
risks that severely threaten their livelihoods.  There are a variety of 
strategies for dealing with the risks that the property strategy creates 
for owners.  In societies that lack a well-developed state, such as pre-
literate societies or societies of settlers located in remote outposts, the 
risks associated with the property strategy may be so overwhelming 
that the society will decide to manage and share significant productive 
resources collectively.  Group ownership, as Bob Ellickson has argued, 
“pools risk.”102 
The need for collective ownership to pool risk is much diminished 
today.  In advanced capitalist societies, owners can buy insurance against 
casualty risks, and, if they have enough resources, they can diversify by 
holding a portfolio of different types of property located in different 
places.  Additionally, government safety nets exist to cushion even the 
severest of misfortunes.  In effect, the social welfare state substitutes for 
collective ownership as a means of reducing the risks associated with the 
property strategy.  Of course, the taxes needed to fund the welfare 
state can also be seen as a qualification on the property strategy.  In this 
respect, even advanced capitalist societies continue to recognize that 
risk is a disadvantage of the property strategy. 
5.  Inequality 
A final concern about the property strategy is that it tends to pro-
mote inequality.  Again, this concern is attributable to the feature of 
accessionary rights.  Property, when well managed, tends to beget more 
property:  as we have seen, the property strategy incorporates a gener-
ous profit-sharing plan in which the owner gets to keep one hundred 
percent of any gains in value attributable to the discrete resource.  
This feature is important because it creates an incentive for the owner 
to work hard to make the resource productive and valuable.  However, 
not all gains in the value of resources are attributable to the skill and 
industry of the owner.  Some will be due to rising market demand for 
resources generally; others will be due to sheer luck, such as when oil 
was discovered under the Clampett farm.103  The portion that can be 
attributed to luck or general conditions of scarcity represents a kind of 
built-in multiplier, whereby those that have property get more prop-
erty without regard to their individual effort or desert. 
 
102 Ellickson, supra note 44, at 1341. 
103 See THE BEVERLY HILLBILLIES (20th Century Fox 1993). 
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Some would see the tendency for the property strategy to produce 
inequality as sufficient grounds to condemn the institution as a matter 
of distributive justice.  Pierre-Joseph Proudhon thought that all prop-
erty was theft,104 and Karl Marx and Frederick Engels believed that the 
first step toward a more just society was the abolition of private prop-
erty.105  While most would not go that far, many still find property’s 
tendency to generate inequality troubling. 
There are also pragmatic reasons to worry about the inequality of 
resource ownership.  Extreme inequality in the distribution of property 
undermines all the reasons previously advanced as strengths of the 
property strategy.  If only a small number of people own property, 
then the property strategy loses its advantage of tapping into dispersed 
local knowledge.  Further, incentives to be productive will exist for 
only a few, there will be no reduction in external transaction costs due 
to the presence of large numbers of potential partners for exchange, 
and the institution of property will offer little in the way of checks and 
balances against concentrated power.  In other words, the tendency 
toward inequality should be disturbing to the friends of property, as 
well as to the more conventional egalitarians animated by considera-
tions of distributive justice. 
CONCLUSION 
What conclusions can be drawn from this balance sheet of ad-
vantages and drawbacks?  I suggest three. 
First, nearly every human society is going to rely on the property 
strategy to some degree.  There are simply too many resources, and 
local knowledge is too important in managing these resources, for the 
property strategy to be eliminated altogether. 
Second, we are unlikely to see any society adopt an unadulterated 
property strategy for the management of all resources.  Any society that 
adopts the property strategy will have to restrict the discretion of owners 
in ways that limit externalities, reduce the risk of monopolies, build pub-
lic access networks, provide mechanisms to moderate the risks associat-
ed with property ownership, and slow the inherent gravitation toward 
 
104 PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY? 13 (Donald R. Kelly & Bonnie G. 
Smith eds. & trans., 1994) (1840). 
105 KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 84 ( John E. 
Toews ed., Bedford/St. Martin’s 1999) (1848) (predicting that advanced countries 
would begin to see the abolition of property). 
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greater inequality.  This reality means that owner discretion will be lim-
ited by a variety of police power regulations, antitrust and public utility 
laws, and systems of taxation and government redistribution. 
Third, there is no reason to expect that the same balance between 
owner autonomy and regulation will be struck in the same way for every 
type of resource.  Some resources are likely to present greater con-
cerns about externalities, monopolies, public access, and inequality.  
Real property—land and buildings—undoubtedly presents larger col-
lective concerns than do toothbrushes, for example.  Thus, we should 
expect to find more rigorous public control of land and buildings than 
of toothbrushes. 
The central point I have tried to make is that property is a distinc-
tive institution for the organization of resources.  This institution rests 
on a combination of dispersion and concentration of authority.  Con-
trol over resources is dispersed across a large number of people.  But 
discretionary authority is concentrated in a one-person, one-resource 
fashion.  Dispersion allows us to tap into local knowledge and also 
provides the conditions for both market exchange and checks and 
balances on the exercise of power.  At the same time, concentration 
produces powerful incentives for effort and investment, reduces the 
costs of exchange, makes it easier to hold persons accountable for ex-
ternalities, and creates the stability needed for individual planning for 
the future.  Understanding how the property strategy works is the first 
step toward making intelligent prescriptions for its proper deploy-
ment—and for appropriate limitations on its use. 
